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APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1. Whether the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the Defendant had
committed the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol, a violation of Section 41-6-44, UCA,
when a fellow officer observed the Defendant driving, a witness stated Defendant was driving, and
Defendant admitted driving; the Defendant's breath had a strong odor of alcohol, the Defendant's
eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and the Defendant had an upper body sway; the Defendant denied
having consumed any alcohol at all, despite the physical signs; and the Defendant did poorly on the
first field sobriety test and then refused to do any further tests.
The standard for reviewing determinations of probable cause to arrest is two-fold. First, the
lower court's factualfindingswill be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Second, the trial
court's conclusions of law based on those facts are to be reviewed under a correctness standard,
according no deference to the lower court's legal conclusions. See State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d
1229, 1232 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted).
The issue was preserved pursuant to the Defendant's entering into a conditional plea
agreement wherein the Defendant reserved the right to appeal the lower court's decision denying
his motion to suppress. (R. at 112.)

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Constitutional Provisions
Statutes
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any person with a blood
alcohol content of 0.08% or greater by weight, or who is under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within this state....

(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his
presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was committed
by the person.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1953 as amended).
AMERICAN FORK CITY, UTAH, ORDINANCES § 41-6-44.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is a criminal appeal. The Defendant was charged by information with
driving under the influence of alcohol, a class "B" misdemeanor, in violation of section 41-6-44
of the Ordinances of American Fork City.
B. Course of Disposition Below
On March 7, 2000, the defendant filed his motion to suppress all evidence
subsequent to the arrest of the Defendant at his home (R. at 26). The court below held an
evidentiary hearing on the matter and issued a ruling on June 14, 2000 denying the Defendant's
motion to suppress. (R. at 78.) On January 24,2001, the Defendant entered into a conditional
plea agreement whereby the Defendant pleaded guilty/no contest to one count of driving while
under the influence of alcohol as charged in the Information. (R. at 112.) As a condition of the
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plea agi'ccineni tin," Defendant was allowed to preserve his right of appeal in order to present his
challenge to the admissibility of the evidence as outlined in his motion to suppress (Is' al I IJ )
On August h, J!HU I lln, I IN lh mhiil -A .IS seiitnin, il h\ IIH I Inn m tbtr* Howard Maetani of the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County and an order for a stay of execution pending appeal
was issued. (R. 138-140). The Defendant filed a nonce -i apj^a

*

ie

u,its itiiiitiiik'J by llns (Villi .HI M „tL»n( ' K.ltibcr 10 ?J^-J l<#i iurther proceedings by the trial
court. (R. at \ > I

xs

*•> h 01 about May 6, 2003, the trial court entered findings of fact and

conclusions oi lav. ;:1»A ID. .

*.

filed his notice of appeal

on June 5, 2003. (R. at 197498).
C. Statement of Facts
1 < )i Li 11111,11 Hi, /(Kill, 1 Hlicnsl isa Shelby and Keith Southard of the American Fork
Police Department were called to assist the Lehi Police Department on a custodial interference
complaint (

)

2. Lehi Police Department reported that two individuals, Gina Singleton and Defendant
Larry Singleton, had taken the 18-month-old daughter of Jamie Boren and were dri\ Ing to
Amu IK mi I'ork 11< m i Km
3. The report from the Lehi Police also stated that both of the individuals in the vehicle
were intoxicated and provided «i \U M ti| il m ul (In- \ 1 hit li flin unit dnsiin 1 \U JI ISCI)
4. Officer Shelby located a truck that fit the description provided and followed the it tick
until it stopped at 403 West 300 South in American Fork.
*

A (in lln! vdiirlc" slopped, \hr individual on the passenger side exited the vehicle.

Officer Shelby made contact with this individual and informed her as to why she wa^ thci v
passenger, who was identifiea . . » , . -

1

.3.

\

*

!

lu

granddaughter. (R. at 186).
6. Officer Shelby then made contact with the Defendant who was exiting the driver's seat
of the vehicle. Officer Shelby immediately detected the odor of alcohol emanating from the
Defendant. (R. at 186).
7. Officer Shelby then went back to speak with Ms. Singleton. At this time, Officer
Southard arrived on the scene and asked Officer Shelby what he could do to assist. Officer
Shelby told Officer Southard to make contact with the driver, who had been reported to Officer
Southard by dispatch as being intoxicated. (R. at 186).
8. He went to make contact with the driver of the vehicle and observed two men on the
sidewalk that leads to the front door. He approached the younger of the two men first and asked
if he was the driver of the vehicle. The young man then pointed to the Defendant and said, "it
wasn't me; it was him." (R. at 185).
9. Officer Southard then contacted the Defendant and asked if he had driven the truck.
Later Officer Shelby indicated to Officer Southard that the Defendant was the person she had
observed driving the vehicle. (R. at 185).
10. When Officer Southard contacted the Defendant, he noticed that the Defendant's
breath had a strong odor of alcohol and that the Defendant's eyes were glassy and bloodshot. He
also observed that the Defendant's upper body was swaying. (R. at 185).
11. Officer Southard told the Defendant that he thought the Defendant had been drinking.
The Defendant responded by stating, "no, you don't, because I haven't had a damn thing to
drink." (R. at 185).
12. Officer Southard then told the Defendant that he would like him to perform field
sobriety tests. The Defendant would start to perform the test and then would become

-4-

uncooperative. (R. at 185)
13.

The Defendant and his wife then invited the officers into their home to get the

baby out of the cold weather. The officers accepted this invitation. (R. at 185)
14.

Once inside the house, Officer Southard resumed his field sobriety tests with the

Defendant. Officer Southard held out his pen and asked the Defendant to touch the top of the
pen with his index finger. The Defendant reached out and touched the pen with his middle
finger, but he had a difficult time doing so. (R. at 184)
15.

Officer Southard then tried to complete the test by having the Defendant follow

the pen with his eyes only. Yet, the Defendant refused to comply with the instruction and just
glared at Officer Southard. (R. at 184)
16.

The Defendant then told the officers to get out of his house. Officer Southard

responded by stating that the Defendant had invited them into his home. (R. at 184)
17.

Officer Southard stated that he believed the Defendant was DUI and that he

needed to continue the field sobriety tests to determine the Defendant's status. (R. at 184)
18.

The Defendant became more uncooperative and stated that the officers needed to

leave his house. Officer Southard told the Defendant that he was going to arrest him for DUI or
he was going to arrest him for obstructing justice for not complying with the field sobriety tests.
(R. at 184)
19.

The Defendant walked past Officer Southard and stated that it was "bullshit."

Officer Southard then grabbed the Defendant and placed him in custody. (R. at 184)
20.

Eventually, the Defendant was taken to the police station where he was given a

breath test. The results of that test showed that the Defendant had a breath alcohol content of
.249. (R. at 183). See Exhibit "A' attached hereto.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The Defendant was properly arrested because the officer had probable cause to
arrest the Defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUT). The officer obtained
sufficient information to know that the Defendant was the driver of a vehicle that was reported to
contain two intoxicated individuals. Upon making contact with the Defendant, the officer
smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from the defendant's breath. The officer also observed
that the Defendant had glassy, bloodshot eyes and that his body swayed back and forth as the
officer spoke to him. Additionally, although the officer was only able to perform a very limited
number of field sobriety tests, the Defendant had trouble with the first one and became upset
during the administration of the second one, becoming uncooperative and belligerent. The
Defendant also denied having had anything to drink. Under these circumstances, the facts
known to the officer at the time of the arrest suggest that the officer could have reasonably
believed that the crime of DUI was committed and that the Defendant committed it. Thus, the
Defendant's arrest wras proper and any evidence seized as a result thereof should not be
suppressed.
ARGUMENT
I.

The officer's arrest of the Defendant was proper because the officer had probable cause
to believe that the Defendant had committed the crime of driving under the influence of
alcohol.
The Defendant was properly arrested because the officer had probable cause to believe

that the Defendant had committed the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol, in
violation of section 41-6-44 of the Ordinances of American Fork City, which is identical to Utah
Code Annotated § 41 -6-44. This statute states in pertinent part:
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(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any person with a blood
alcohol content of 0.08% or greater by weight, or who is under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders
the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control
of a vehicle within this state....
Regarding the arrest of the suspect, the ordinance further states that:
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in
his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was
committed by the person.
Id. Therefore, under the ordinance and statute, an officer may arrest an individual for DUI if he
or she has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred and that the violation was
committed by the individual.
With regard to probable cause determinations, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that
"probable cause is more than suspicion but less than certainty." State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d
220, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Indeed, "In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal technicians,
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." State v. Dorsev,
731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing Briegar v. United States. 338 U.S. 160, 175,
69 S. Ct. 1302,1310 (1949)) (alterations in original). More specifically, to determine whether
the officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant for driving under the influence, in
violation of the aforementioned statute, the test is "whether from the facts known to the officer,
and the inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in
his position would be justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense." Layton
City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing State v. Hatcher. 495 P.2d 1259,1260
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(Utah 1972) (footnote omitted)).
In light of the standard articulated above, determining whether the officer had probable
cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI is an imprecise determination of probability that must be
made according to the totality of the facts and circumstances of each individual case. As the
lower court found, the facts and circumstances of the matter at hand meet this standard and
establish that the officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI. This determination
was correct and should not be overturned, as discussed below.
In reviewing the lower court's determination that probable cause for arrest existed in the
matter at hand, the Utah Court of Appeal's application of the aforementioned standard in Lavton
City v. Noon, 736 P.2d at 1037-38, is instructive. In Noon, the Utah Court of Appeals applied
the standard in upholding a finding of probable cause to arrest for DUI where an officer
responded to a call from a convenience store clerk reporting that an intoxicated customer was
about to become an intoxicated driver. See id. at 1037. Upon arriving at the store, the officer
observed only a single automobile in the parking lot. See id. at 1038. The officer then
confirmed the identity of the individual reported with the store clerk, as well as the fact that the
individual had driven the vehicle observed in the parking lot. See id. Moreover, the officer
could smell alcohol on the defendant's breath, heard the defendant's slurred speech, and
observed the defendant's unsteady walk. The defendant also performed the field sobriety tests
poorly. See id. Given these facts, the court concluded that the officer reasonably believed "that
[the defendant] was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of
driving a vehicle, and (2) that [the defendant] had been intoxicated while driving the parked
vehicle." Id. (alteration in original).
Contrary to the assertion made by the Defendant in his appellate brief, as applied to the
-8-

matter at hand, the application of the probable cause standard articulated above yields a similar
result to that in Noon because the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the
arrest suggest that the officer reasonably believed the offense of DUI had been committed and
that the Defendant committed it. See Brief of Appellant at 12. More particularly, the facts and
circumstances known to the officer at the time he arrested the Defendant, giving rise to probable
cause, include the officer's knowing from the dispatch report that the driver and passenger of
the vehicle were intoxicated. (Hr'g on Mot. to Suppress Tr. at 16-17.) Once the officer
responded to the backup request from the other officer who first located the vehicle, the arresting
officer positively identified the driver of the vehicle. The officer requesting assistance told the
arresting officer that the Defendant had been the driver of the vehicle, as did the Defendant's son
and the Defendant himself. (Tr. at 13,17.) From this information, there was no doubt that the
defendant was the driver of the vehicle.
Upon identifying the Defendant as the driver of the vehicle, the officer approached the
Defendant and detected the odor of alcohol coming from the Defendant's person. (Tr. at 17.)
The officer observed that the Defendant had glassy, bloodshot eyes and noticed that the
Defendant's body swayed back and forth as the Defendant spoke to the officer. (Tr. at 17.)
Additionally, as the officer began the field sobriety tests, he observed that the Defendant had a
difficult time reaching out and touching the top of the officer's pen, which the Defendant did
using the wrong finger. (Tr. at 19.) Similarly, as the officer moved the pen, the Defendant did
not follow the pen with his eyes and became upset. (Tr. at 19.) The Defendant glared at the
officer angrily as the officer moved the pen three or four times. The Defendant's demeanor
became uncooperative and belligerent. (Tr. at 19.) All of these facts and circumstances were
known to or observed by the officer prior to the time of the arrest and support a determination by
-9-

the officer that the Defendant was incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle.
Furthermore, when the officer told the Defendant that he thought the Defendant had been
drinking, the Defendant responded, "No you don't, because I haven't had a damn thing to drink."
(Supp Hr'g Tr. at 17.) In light of the strong odor of alcohol coming from the Defendant's breath,
the Defendant's statement was a false denial and false denials are often significant in probable
cause determinations. See State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). It has
been stated that '"[c]ourts and commentators generally agree that a defendant's false or evasive
responses [to police questions] in conjunction with highly suspicious behavior may be used to
determine the existence of probable cause.'" Id. (quoting State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 542
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)). The odor of alcohol coming from the Defendant, his physical
characteristics, his uncooperative and belligerent manner while the officer was conducting the
field sobriety tests, and his inability to adequately perform the field sobriety test(s) the officer
administered constitute "highly suspicious" behavior. This behavior suggests that the Defendant
had been drinking and was intoxicated. Thus, the Defendant's denying having had anything to
drink, coupled with this behavior and the officer's observations regarding the Defendant's
physical appearance and inability to balance, support the lower court's finding of probable cause
to arrest for DUI. Taken together, these factors support the lower court's finding that the officer
had probable cause to believe that the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol sufficient to
render him incapable of safely driving a vehicle, and that the defendant had been in control of a
vehicle while in this condition, thereby justifying the arrest.
In contrast to the Defendant's argument on appeal, the Defendant's alcohol content later
established by the intoxilyzer test was not necessary in order to establish probable cause to arrest
for DUI. In his brief, the Defendant states that "[t]he only probable cause for effecting a valid
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arrest came as a result of field sobriety tests that were performed at the police station after the
original arrest had been affected." Brief for Appellant at 9. This statement is incorrect. The
remainder of the field sobriety tests were not needed to establish probable cause to arrest. The
officer had sufficient information including his own observations of the Defendant, the odor of
alcohol coming from the Defendant's breath, his physical appearance, and his inability to control
different parts of his body. Further tests were not needed to make the determination that the
Defendant could not safely operate a vehicle, but had done so.
Similarly, the intoxilyzer test results are not needed to find probable cause to arrest for
DUI, nor would the intoxilyzer test result be necessary to convict, according to the language of
the relevant statute. The language of the statute set forth above indicates that an individual must
be at 0.08% OR incapable of safely operating an automobile in order to be found guilty of
driving under the influence. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1953 as amended) (emphasis
added). Thus, a determination of whether the individual could safely operate the vehicle would
suffice. Without the intoxilyzer test result, there is enough evidence, as discussed above, for the
officer to determine that the Defendant was incapable of safely operating an automobile, thereby
resulting in not only probable cause to arrest, but a conviction, as well. However, a conviction is
not at issue in this matter and a prima facie case of DUI need not be presented to support the
arrest. It is noted that with the intoxilyzer test results, there is also significant evidence to show
that the Defendant also violated the ordinance by operating the vehicle at a time when he was
intoxicated over the legal limit. But, again, this test is not needed to establish probable cause to
arrest.
As explained above, the Defendant's arrest was proper because the officer had probable
cause to arrest him for DUI. Since the Defendant's arrest was proper, any evidence seized
-11-

subsequently or as a result thereof is not tainted and should not be suppressed. Again, this was
the finding of the lower court and it should be upheld.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT

The facts and circumstances of the matter at hand indicate that the Defendant's
arrest was proper because the officer had probable cause to believe that the crime of DUI had
been committed and that the Defendant had committed it. Again, the officer smelled a strong
odor of alcohol coming from the Defendant's breath and observed the Defendant's bloodshot,
glassy eyes. The officer also observed the Defendant's body sway back and forth as he spoke
with the officer. When trying to administer the field sobriety tests to the Defendant, the
Defendant struggled with the first one and became uncooperative and belligerent during the
second. The Defendant also adamantly denied having had anything to drink. Under these
circumstances, the officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI. Therefore, the
Defendant's arrest was proper and any evidence seized as a result thereof was proper and should
not be suppressed. Such was the determination by the lower court and it should be upheld at this
time.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ffi/yday of October, 2003.
HANSEN WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C.
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OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY,
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AMERICAN FORK CITY,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 005100338
Proceedings

VS.
LARRY SINGLETON

Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE HOWARD

MAETANNI

98 NORTH CENTER
AMERICAN

FORK, UTAH

84 003
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January 25th, 2001
THE COURT:

The Court calls American Fork City

versus Larry Singleton.
MR. WOOTTON:

Good morning, your Honor.

Noall

Wootton on behalf of Mr. Singleton.
MR. HANSEN:
to a —

Your Honor, I think that we have agreed

stipulated our conditional plea agreement based on

the appeal for the motion to suppress.
We do have some questions about the record.
MR. WOOTTON:
your Honor.

If I might state that my concerns,

At one point shortly thereafter we had our

meeting on the Motion to Suppress, I asked for a copy of the
tapes.

I did get the tape.

Found that pn the tape that I

had the only thing with reference to this case was our oral
arguments after the evidence had been presented.

I'm

assuming that there was another tape, and that the evidence
that was presented before the Court is on that tape. What I
have asked counsel to stipulate to is that the police report
itself had formed a basis for my motion in the first place,
may be made a part of the record.

And that if we can find

the other tape, fine.

If we can't, we'll use the police

report as the record.

If we need to augment the police

report with additional stipulations of fact, we can do that.
The other thing that I talked to him about was the
fact that —

I don't think there's a great deal of urgency in

Lora Barker, Certified Court Transcriber
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Were tests demonstrated by 6fficer? \ / l S
SEARCHES
A.
Vehicle:
Was subject's vehicle searched?

When?

A//4>

Person who performed the search

Subject's ability to follow instructions

fJ P

Evidence

Where?

, /Jd»H

pioogly

.
AVrt*

' "

fl//$

CHEMICAL TESTS:

/Qor Ms. SiAl£/j0ft&, do you understand that you are under arrest for
^f

Driving under*, the influence of alcohol and/or drugs or with a measurable amount of a controlled
substance or metabolite in your body? (41-6-44, 41-6-44.6 UCA)

Q

An alcohol offense under 21 years of age in violation of 32A-12-209 UCA?

Response (if any) V & ^ / J " ^pU JtAA/t'/l *f~ 'he-S-l'cA / ^ e
I hereby request that you submiUp a chemical test to determine the alcohol (drug) Content of your blood^j
I request that you take a
wi,*ft^
test.
(blood -ASfekth - urine)
(7j

The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was administered:

Test results indicating an unlawful amount of alcohol or a controlled substance or its metabolite in your
/^B^^h/blood/urine in violation of Utah Law, or the presence of alcohol and/or drugs sufficient to render you
Sn6apable of safely driving a motor vehicle may, result in denial, suspension, or disqualification of your driving
privilege or refusal to issue you a license.
What is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Response: — i .
Did subject submit to a chgmical test? V *-**
Test Administered hy
£CXA-K\\A4Q
'
Time:.
Results
< csj~
Serial No. of test instrument (*Xr &\b-l~$c>

.

Type of test
% •CVtrfa
Where? A i h f ? D~"
Was subject notified of results? y ^ 5
7

(if the subject refuses the test, read the following)
The folfowing admonition was given by me to the subject:
If you refuse the test or fail to foltow my instructions, the test will not be given. However, I must warn you that
your driving privilege may be revoked for one year for a first refusal or 18 months for a subsequent refusal
after July 1,1993, with no provision for limited driving. After you have taken the test, you will be permitted to
have a physician of your own choice administer a test at your own expense, in addition to the one I have
requested, so long as it does not delay the test or tests requested by me. I wffl maketoetestresyteLayajlable
to you, if you take the test.
CONFlDENTIAL
Access Restricted to Agencies of
Unless you immediately request a test, the test cannot be given. Response7flb30^m/na/ Justice System
RELEASED TO CITY ATTQPNEv

